“Sometimes it is difficult for us to stand up and change this”: an analysis of power within priority-setting for health following devolution in Kenya by Taegtmeyer, Miriam & Theobald, Sally
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
“Sometimes it is difficult for us to stand up
and change this”: an analysis of power
within priority-setting for health following
devolution in Kenya
Rosalind McCollum1* , Miriam Taegtmeyer1, Lilian Otiso2, Nelly Muturi2, Edwine Barasa3,4, Sassy Molyneux5,6,
Tim Martineau1 and Sally Theobald1
Abstract
Background: Practices of power lie at the heart of policy processes. In both devolution and priority-setting, actors
seek to exert power through influence and control over material, human, intellectual and financial resources.
Priority-setting arises as a consequence of the needs and demand exceeding the resources available, requiring
some means of choosing between competing demands. This paper examines the use of power within priority-
setting processes for healthcare resources at sub-national level, following devolution in Kenya.
Methods: We interviewed 14 national level key informants and 255 purposively selected respondents from across
the health system in ten counties. These qualitative data were supplemented by 14 focus group discussions (FGD)
involving 146 community members in two counties. We conducted a power analysis using Gaventa’s power cube
and Veneklasen’s expressions of power to interpret our findings.
Results: We found Kenya’s transition towards devolution is transforming the former centralised balance of power,
leading to greater ability for influence at the county level, reduced power at national and sub-county (district)
levels, and limited change at community level. Within these changing power structures, politicians are felt to play a
greater role in priority-setting for health. The interfaces and tensions between politicians, health service providers
and the community has at times been felt to undermine health related technical priorities. Underlying social
structures and discriminatory practices generally continue unchanged, leading to the continued exclusion of the
most vulnerable from priority-setting processes.
Conclusions: Power analysis of priority-setting at county level after devolution in Kenya highlights the need for
stronger institutional structures, processes and norms to reduce the power imbalances between decision-making
actors and to enable community participation.
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Background
Practices of power lie at the heart of policy processes
[1]. In both devolution and priority-setting, actors seek
to exert power through influence and control over ma-
terial, human, intellectual and financial resources [2, 3].
In both processes, a range of actors, each with their own
values, needs and interests must make judgements and
decisions about the selection of priorities contained
within plans and budgets. Priority-setting and devolution
can be viewed as two sides to the same coin. Potential
threats to priority-setting will also threaten the potential
success of devolution.
Priority-setting, the distribution of resources among
competing healthcare services, patients or patient
groups, arises as a consequence of the needs and de-
mand for healthcare resources (such as budget, staff
time, equipment and facilities) exceeding the resources
available [4–6]. As a result, some means of choosing be-
tween competing demands is required [6]. Ideally,
priority-setting is explicit, seeking to set clear priorities,
with a transparent rationale and resource allocation
based on agreed upon criteria [7]. Some of these criteria
include “benefit, evidence, cost, efficiency, equity, equal-
ity, benefit to a country’s economy, severity of disease,
prevalence of disease, solidarity, protection of the vul-
nerable, and more” (p21 [8]). While sometimes viewed
as a purely technical process, priority setting is typically
a complex, value laden process where actor’s values and
interests are brought to bear, negotiating decisions about
which values or principles should dominate as political,
institutional and managerial factors come into play [9].
Decentralisation is a dynamic process which transfers
authorities or powers for decision-making, planning and
management of public services from national to
sub-national levels [10]. Decentralisation reforms may
be classified as four main types: de-concentration occurs
when authority for administrative functions shifts to
sub-national offices within the Ministry of Health; dele-
gation occurs when semi-autonomous agencies are
granted new powers (typically still administrative); devo-
lution occurs when administrative, political and fiscal re-
sponsibilities shift to the sub-national level of locally
elected government, and privatisation when ownership is
granted to private bodies [11, 12].
Devolution reforms most accurately describe the
transition which began in 2013 in Kenya. Devolution
ought to transform authority, power and responsibility
for implementation between actors. Despite their popu-
larity, devolution reforms have a mixed record in terms
of realising their many objectives, such as improving
national unity, equity, efficiency, responsiveness, ac-
countability and community participation [11, 12]. This
is often due to difference between the official public
policy goals for health and the goals of individuals,
including local politicians and other decision-making
actors [13].
The success (or failure) of both priority-setting and
devolution are heavily dependent on how actors respond
to changing distributions of power. Power is “the degree
of control over material, human, intellectual and finan-
cial resources exercised by different sections of society”
(page41 [2]). Power is both dynamic and relational, ra-
ther than absolute and is exercised through the social,
economic and political relations between individuals and
groups [2]. The distribution of power can change with
the context, circumstances and interest of actors and
can be expressed in a range of forms from domination
and resistance to collaboration and transformation [2].
In 2013 Kenya’s governance system was transformed,
following the ambitious devolution of political, fiscal and
administrative functions to 47 new sub-national county
governments [14]. This led to revised roles for national
Ministry of Health and increasing responsibilities now
held at the newly formed County government level. De-
volution reform objectives in Kenya seek to “tackle long-
term, deeply entrenched disparities between regions; in-
crease the responsiveness and accountability of govern-
ment to citizens; allow greater autonomy to different
regions and groups, and re-balance power away from a
historically strong central government” (page2 [15]).
This led to changing roles and power for actors across
the health system (see Table 2 [16]). Roles were reduced
for national level in coordinating partners, recruitment
and management of health workers and planning for
budget allocation. National level actors have retained re-
sponsibility for policy development, quality assurance
and provision of national referral (level four) services.
The former district level (now largely considered similar
to the sub-county level) continues to hold responsibility to
implement and deliver health services, but no longer has
control over budget allocation (compared with prior to
devolution when annual planning and budget allocation
responsibilities for management of user fees had been
decentralised to this level [17, 18]) (see Fig. 1). Prior to the
introduction of devolution reforms in 2013 Kenya had a
‘highly decentralised form of de-concentration’ with hos-
pitals experiencing some degree of autonomy over man-
agement functions [19]. Following devolution, previous
studies have found a recentralisation of management (in-
cluding financial management) from health facility to
county level, particularly within county hospitals [17, 19].
The changing roles and responsibilities for national,
county, district/sub-county and community level before
and after devolution have been summarised elsewhere
(see Table 2 [16]).
Kenya’s health system is funded from four main
sources – the government from taxes and donor funding
at both national and county levels; off-budget donor
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funding; National Hospital Insurance Fund member con-
tributions; private health insurance member contribu-
tions, and out of pocket spending at point of care [20].
This paper will examine the power dynamics relating to
budget allocation and annual planning responsibilities
for actors at the county level, who also hold responsibil-
ity for developing the five year county integrated devel-
opment plan, for health service delivery for level one to
four services (community, primary and county referral
services), for recruitment and management of health
workers and for coordination of partners. Funds avail-
able at county level come from three possible sources; 1)
transfers from central government which comprise an
equitable share allocated to all the 47 counties from na-
tional general revenue collections using a revenue allo-
cation formula, conditional grants ring fenced for
specific functions, and an equalization fund for the 14
previously marginalized counties, 2) locally generated
revenue, and 3) donor funding (see Table 1 [21]). The
annual planning and budgeting cycle has been described
elsewhere (Fig. 2 [16]). In summary, national circulars
are issued, which prompt the development of the annual
plan and budgeting process. As part of this process, the
county budget steering committee and county executive
committee set budget ceilings and develop the county
fiscal strategy paper; public participation meetings
should be held for the identification and validation of
priorities set, with the health department working to
align their plan and budget to meet budget ceilings
assigned, under the oversight of the county assembly
prior to finalisation and approval from both the county
assembly and the county executive committee [16].
County level actors engaged in the priority-setting
process for the annual budget planning cycle (see Fig. 2,
[16])include:
 State actors, including governor and members of
county executive committee (CEC) (representatives
appointed by the governor for ten service
departments within the county, including the county
executive member for health, who may or may not
have health experience) and members of county
assembly (elected local ward representatives)
 Health service providers, including county level
technical decision makers (e.g. members of county
health management team) and health actors at other
levels, including sub-county health management team
and health workers at facility and community levels
 Community members, including selected
community representatives who sit on specific
quarterly health planning and review committees
along with the general community, who should be
engaged in priority-setting through public participa-
tion forums.
In the wake of devolution’s reforms in Kenya we are
left with a number of questions, relating to the health
sector. How is power re-distributed? And how does this
Fig. 1 Pre (left) and post (right) devolution health systems structures in Kenya. Green arrows indicate governance, black lines indicate supervision
pathways, red arrows indicate flow of funding. The black dotted line between national and county indicates the new relationship between
national and county governments. Red box surrounding some boxes indicates structures which receive funding directly from national level
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Table 1 Dimensions of Gaventa’s power cube (Barasa et al. 2016; Rowlands 1997; Veneklasen et al. 2002)
Spaces for power
Closed spaces Elites make decisions behind closed doors, which in Kenya include discussions between county executive committee
members and the governor or among members of county assembly;
Invited spaces Citizens are invited to participate by authorities, which in Kenya includes the public participation forums;
Claimed spaces Less powerful actors claim spaces from the power holders, which in Kenya includes the use of social media platforms by
citizens to raise awareness about poor quality services.
Places for power
Global Globalisation shifts traditional understandings of the location and exercise of power. Global actors, forces and structures in
turn influence and shape national and local level power relationships. In Kenya this includes international pressure for
devolution.
National County Health
worker
The role of the national level in power dynamics, influences the legitimacy and power dynamics at other (sub-national)
and local levels. Decentralisation, transforms national and local power relationships.
In Kenya, this has contributed to reduced power for national level to identify, plan and budget for health priorities and
actions at sub-national levels, with greater power now held at county level and lower levels of power held by health
workers at sub-county and health facility level compared with prior to devolution.
Local Local levels may be dependent on other levels for the extent to which power is legitimated. In Kenya, community level
actors may be involved with priority-setting through public participation forums, or through community representation in
other existing committees at community and facility levels.
Forms and visibility of power
Visible power’ Observable decision making. This includes the visible and definable rules, structures, authorities, institutions and procedures for
decision-making. Strategies targeting this level seek to change the ‘who, how and what’ to increase accountability
of priority-setting processes.
‘Hidden power’ Setting the political agenda, is less obvious. Certain powerful people and institutions maintain their influence by
controlling who is involved with decision-making and what is on the agenda. Actions to address this level include
empowering advocacy strategies that seek to strengthen organisations of poor and marginalised people to influence the
way in which political agenda is shaped.
‘Invisible power’ Shaping meaning and what is important. Problems and issues are kept from the minds of the actors involved, by
influencing how they think about their place in the world and controlling access to information, so that people are
unable to make informed choices. In this dimension power operates at a deeper ‘invisible’ level, so that actors may
unwittingly follow against their own best interests, thereby avoiding conflict by making it impossible for people to
imagine anything different to the status quo. Power is closely associated with ideology. Beliefs, values, attitudes and ways
of analysing life, enforced by structures such as family, education system, religion, the media, the economy and the state,
tend to reinforce the dominant ideology and power of the dominant groups within it. Change strategies at this level
target social and political culture and individual consciousness.
Fig. 2 Power interfaces between decision-making actors (modified Brinkerhoff and Bossert, 2008)
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vary across counties? Who benefits from this
re-distribution? How are the new powers used? Do new
priorities lead to improved health equity? We aim to
provide a power analysis of priority-setting at the new
county level, to understand how power influences
priority-setting in Kenya.
Methods
Theory and practice
This paper presents the analysis of data collected as part
of a wider study which sought to explore priority-setting
for community health and equity since devolution. We
used a naturalistic approach to unpack power in its fluid
and multiple forms and to observe the changes for
priority-setting following devolution as they occurred
[22, 23]. We used multiple qualitative methods including
key informant interviews, in-depth interviews and focus
group discussions, including a range of perspectives
from national to community level.
To explore power dynamics within priority-setting for
health, we adopted two complementary frameworks as
the basis for a power analysis - Gaventa’s power cube
(2006) [24] (see Fig. 3), incorporating aspects of Venek-
lasen’s expressions of power (2002) [2] to more fully ex-
plore power and the complexity of the social, political
and economic factors (among others) which influence it.
The power cube considers the spaces, places and forms
of power (see Table 1). Spaces for power include oppor-
tunities and channels where actors can potentially influ-
ence policy and decisions [24]. Naturally, these are
shaped by power relations surrounding who can partici-
pate within them. Power relations adapt and change as
these spaces are realised, with power gained from one
space through skills, capacity and experience, used to
enter and affect other spaces [24]. Places for power in-
clude household, local, national and global arenas. Venek-
lasen’s expressions of power (2002) [2] was helpful in
identifying the four main expressions of power demon-
strated within these places since devolution: power over;
power to; power with and power within (see Table 2). The
final aspect of power considered in the power cube is
forms of power. This builds on ‘three dimensions of
power’ work by Steven Lukes (1974) [25], and subsequent
expansion by Veneklasen et al. (2002) to identify three
main forms – visible, hidden and invisible [2]. Underlying
the interfaces between actors, the dynamics at work within
the power cube and the expressions of power lie individ-
uals’ experiences of power and privilege, which shape their
social exclusion (or inclusion) and access to the
decision-making table [26].
Methods, participants and process
We conducted individual interviews with 269 individuals
and 14 focus group discussions with a further 146 par-
ticipants (see Table 4 [16]) between March 2015 – April
2016. Participants include 14 purposively selected na-
tional level key informants with specialist knowledge of
the health priority-setting process. We purposively se-
lected 120 county level decision-makers from ten diverse
study counties (see Tables 3 and 4 [16]) to include a
range of actors involved with priority-setting, including:
politicians involved with decision-making for health,
county treasury staff, gender and children’s office repre-
sentatives and technical decision makers for health in-
cluding members of the county health management
team. We continued to interview across counties, due to
the diversity of contexts and continued until saturation
was reached by respondents at county level. Saturation
was considered reached when there were no new major
themes emerging from the findings. In-depth interviews
(IDIs) with 49 health workers from sub-county, health
facility and community levels were carried out in three
(out of the ten) counties. Due to research time and re-
source constraints it was not possible to conduct this
depth of research across all ten counties studied for the
county level interviews, however, we sought to ensure as
much diversity of responses as possible, by including
counties which represented urban, rural agrarian and
rural pastoralist settings.,We carried out interviews
with 86 close-to-community (CTC) providers, their
supervisors and community members and 14 focus
group discussions with community members from
two counties (out of the three) (see Table 4 [16]).
This data was collected as part of an ongoing
REACHOUT CTC provider quality improvement
study in two counties (urban and rural agrarian).
REACHOUT is an ambitious five year international
research consortium aiming to generate knowledge to
strengthen the performance of CHWs and other
close-to-community (CTC) providers in promotional,
preventive and curative primary health services in six
Fig. 3 Gaventa’s power cube (2006)
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low- and middle-income countries in rural and urban
areas in Africa and Asia, including Kenya.
A primary point of contact (usually the county executive
committee member for health) in each of the ten counties
was approached to introduce the study, either through
email or face-to-face introduction. This point of contact
then typically provided introduction of the interviewer to
other study participants. Participants were interviewed at
a location convenient to them which afforded privacy,
typically at their place of work. Qualitative data were re-
corded with participant’s consent and transcribed verba-
tim by research assistants with extensive transcription
experience, supplemented by note taking by the researcher
who conducted the interviews. Interviews typically lasted
Table 2 Forms of power and their expression in Kenya
Form of power Definition (Veneklasen, 2002) Expression in Kenya
Power over Power is viewed as ‘zero-sum’ where the more
power one person has than the less the other has.
Having power involved taking it from someone
else and then using it to dominate and prevent
others from gaining it.
Power over was typically exerted by state actors at the top of the
institutional hierarchy within the county, by the governor, the county
executive committee member for health and the members of county
assembly, with some county executive committee members for health
adopting an authoritarian approach, limiting sharing of knowledge and
information.
Power over was demonstrated in interactions between state actors
(members of county assembly and governor and county executive
committee members).
Power over was demonstrated by state actors (e.g. county executive
committee member for health) and other providers, with some technical
decision makers feeling unable to challenge decisions which may not be
suitable.
“Well just to be frank with you sometimes it is not easy for us to say no okay
[to politicians]… my seniors here are politically appointed so at any time now
they can change in the cabinet level of the county… sometimes is difficult for
us to stand up and change this.” County Health Respondent IDI, Male45
Patronage norms led to misuse of power in some settings, with resources
channelled to voters/ citizens from similar tribe as the more ‘powerful’
leaders.
Community members were not informed of all the choices available
to them, or of the benefits and disadvantages of those choices limited
their access to knowledge.
Power with Based on mutual support and collaboration to
build collective strength. It helps build bridges
and promote more equitable relations
Mechanisms for power with have been introduced according to the
Constitution, e.g. public participation meetings. However, failure to address
norms which limit power within e.g. patriarchal norms, have led to limited
active participation from many citizens, leaving these forums open to elite
capture and limiting opportunities for power with.
Overall, most county level state actors have made limited attempts to
share priority-setting power with actors at other levels.
“The issue of health care in my view is no more in the hands of the health
care providers, but rather in the [hands of] policy makers.” County Health
Respondent IDI, Male24
Exceptions include: one county where county level actors have plans for
broader decentralisation to lower levels; in another county the county
executive committee sought to reduce the power imbalance by sharing
knowledge with actors from community level to county level, finding
common ground and understanding among the interests of actors from
all levels.
Power to act Refers to the potential of every person to shape
their life.
Outside of county level technical and political actors, other potential
decision makers such as health workers, sub-county actors and community
members appear to have limited power to act, with limited meaningful
participation.
“So in a way we are feeling there is a gap. It [decision-making] is happening
at the county level but they are not involving the most important people...
We are not involved in decision-making nowadays in the county government.”
CHEW IDI, Male01
Power within Relates to a person’s sense of self-worth, values
and self-knowledge, having the capacity to have
hope and affirming dignity and fulfilment.
Power within relates closely with how forces and structures, such as
patriarchy and patronage remain unaddressed and as a consequence there
has been limited scope for empowerment and increasing citizens power
within to enable them to fully engage with priority-setting (see power
with above).
“…members of county assembly are not very comfortable with the system
[public participation] because they believe it is empowering the citizen so much
that they are losing the political grip and that has been the issue across the
country.” National Respondent IDI, Male10
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40 to 60min. We used topic guides, with questions which
explored the actors and priority-setting processes for
health following devolution; participants understanding of
the implications of priorities set, particularly for access,
use and effective coverage of health services. The topic
guides were developed through an iterative process fol-
lowing informal discussions with national key informants
and colleagues and a period of reflection and revision after
data collection in one county to ensure questions elicited
the responses sought.
National, county and some health worker level in-
terviews were carried out by a foreign researcher in
English language (RM), who completed the research
as part of doctoral studies and who has received
training in qualitative data collection and analysis.
RM had no prior relationship with any of the re-
search participants. Community and some health fa-
cility level respondents were interviewed by trained
research assistants in Kiswahili or Kamba (depending
on respondents’ preference).
Analytical process
We adopted a framework approach to analysis in order
to classify and organise data according to the key
themes, concepts and emerging categories [27]. This in-
cluded an inductive aspect, which allowed meaning to
emerge from the data [28] through familiarisation with
the data by reading and re-reading transcripts. Following
this a coding framework was developed which drew on
understanding of the literature, the objectives of the
interview, the themes within the data collection tool and
issues raised by the respondents themselves during inter-
views. Nvivo 10 software was utilised to manage and
code data. Following coding, data was charted in order
to summarise data while still retaining its context and
essence [27], based on data from all ten counties. Data
coding and preliminary analysis was carried out by RM,
with regular discussions with LO, MT, TM and ST
through the data collection and analysis process. Pre-
liminary findings were presented to fellow researchers
(including SM) engaged in health systems research in
Kenya at an early stage in the data collection process,
allowing the opportunity to develop data collection and
analysis plans. Further presentation of findings with
NM, LO, MT, TM, ST provided opportunities to critique
and refine the analysis. SM and EB participate in a
health systems governance learning site, conducting re-
lated research within Kilifi county in Kenya. Findings
were then analysed collectively, highlighting differences
between counties or types of respondent where appro-
priate. Given the nature of the themes which emerged
from the findings, there was a strong fit between these
themes and with Gaventa’s power cube and Veneklas-
sen’s expressions of power (2002). We therefore carried
out a re-analysis in light of these themes, given the simi-
larity between our findings and these frameworks, in
order to further the nuance of the analysis and to enable
a deeper look at power in all its manifestations. Final
analysis and manuscript development were finalised with
inputs from all authors.
Trustworthiness and ethics
Discussions and interviews conducted in Kiswahili or
Kamba were translated to English, with a selection
back-translated for quality checking. Data was triangulated
between sources to minimise bias. We reflected on our
position as UK and Kenyan researchers and adopted re-
flexivity and positionality lenses within the analysis ap-
proach. Regular discussions and presentations with
colleagues and other researchers within and outside Kenya
were an important part of maintaining validity throughout
the research process. All participants were provided with
information about the nature of the study and it’s objec-
tives and gave informed written consent. Ethical approval
was received from Kenya Medical Research Institute
(KEMRI) and Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, with
research permit from National Commission for Science
Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI).
Results
Our results relating to power are presented in line with
Gaventa’s power cube and Veneklassen’s expressions of
power, as these are a natural fit according to the
power-related findings arising from the data.
1. Place and expression of power
Global - Literature describes that devolution in Kenya
was influenced by international pressure placed on the
Kenyan government to finalise a new Constitution and
introduce devolution reforms, as part of the National
Peace Accord (2008) in the wake of 2007’s politically in-
stigated violence following the controversial general
elections [29].
National and sub-national - Since devolution, power
dynamics and relationships have changed dramatically
following the creation of the 47 new county govern-
ments (see Table 2 [16]). Nationwide restructuring re-
sulted in the establishment of two levels of government
(national and county). The former provincial level was
removed, a new county level was created and authorities
and responsibilities for the national and district (sub--
county) levels have changed.
“Decentralization has only recognized two layers of
government; the national level and the county level, so
now resources are only allocated to counties.” National
Respondent IDI, Male11
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National - Respondents described how those working at
the national level saw a decline in their power to determine
priorities or assign budget at sub-national levels, compared
with prior to devolution (see Table 2 [16]).
Sub-national - County level governments took on re-
sponsibility and power for planning, budgeting and
implementing health services from community to county
referral hospital level. The ability to influence health pri-
orities within the county was typically viewed as primar-
ily remaining in the grasp of state actors (the governor,
the county executive committee members and members
of the county assembly). Health managers were involved
to varying degrees within the process, but were not typ-
ically viewed as key decision-makers.
“The issue of health care in my view is no more in the
hands of the health care providers, but rather in the
[hands of] policy makers.” County Health Respondent
IDI, Male24
Health worker – Health workers, particularly at sub-
county, health facility and community levels often de-
scribed feeling excluded from both county and commu-
nity decision-making structures.
“So in a way we are feeling there is a gap. It [decision-
making] is happening at the county level but they are
not involving the most important people... We are not
involved in decision-making nowadays in the name of
system of the county government.” Kitui County
CHEW, Male01
Local – Pre-existing avenues for community participa-
tion exist, including community representation within
quarterly meetings, health facility management commit-
tees, participation during community dialogue days. In
addition, new avenues such as public participation
meetings, where community members including repre-
sentatives for women, youth and people with disabilities
[14], have been introduced to provide a forum for com-
munity to participate in selecting priorities for health
(and other sectors). However, community members
who participated in our study did not describe partici-
pation in decision-making as one of their roles regard-
ing health. In part this may be due to limited efforts
from county actors to encourage attendance and active
involvement of community members, including ‘vulner-
able groups’ (see [21]). In addition, the education of
community members to understand their role in
decision-making was a positive exception, rather than
the norm (see box 2 [16]).
The key actors are largely operating in new territory
(see introduction). To further complicate this there is
lack of formal guidance and clarity about roles and
responsibilities for priority-setting. Leaders therefore
need to negotiate for power alongside the roll-out and
enforcement of priority-setting and service implementa-
tion. Political influence, control of resources and know-
ledge were viewed as important sources of power and
are used by key decision-makers to exert and extend
their ‘power over’ other actors (see Table 2). ‘Power over’
was by far the most common expression of power de-
scribed by respondents within priority-setting for health
at county level, although all four forms are present to
varying degrees (see Table 2). Our study identified that
negotiations surrounding power has created five main
interfaces between actors within each county (see Fig. 2,
modified [30]). These are explained more in the follow-
ing section.
1) Between state actors (CEC and county assembly) –
these negotiations tended to demonstrate attempts
to exert ‘power over’ the other state actor for
reasons of political gain.
2) Between state actors (CEC and county assembly)
and providers (county level technical decision
makers and health workers) - providers often felt
that following devolution, power for priority-setting
had relocated from health service providers to state
actors.
3) Between providers (county level technical decision
makers, sub-county managers and health workers) -
providers working at levels below county level (sub-
county, health facility and community level) often felt
excluded from the priority-setting process, with limited
scope for ‘power with’ other decision-making actors.
4) Between state actors (CEC and county assembly)
and the community - negotiations between state
actors and the community ought to be stronger
following devolution, with the introduction of
public participation meetings. Challenges exist
however, with these mechanisms failing to address
underlying norms or promote ‘power within’,
thereby creating a barrier to empowering the whole
community with ‘power to’ identify priorities (see
section 3 community accountability and
empowerment [21]).
Between providers (health workers) and the commu-
nity - health workers at times felt excluded from county
level decision-making structures as well as community
level public participation meetings.
2. Spaces of power
Closed spaces: Our findings reveal that elites (those
persons who hold access to the control of power and re-
sources) often make decisions behind closed doors, this
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includes discussions between CEC members and the
governor or among members of county assembly. We
found that the degree to which decisions made occurred
in closed spaces appeared to be influenced by the leader-
ship style of those leading the priority-setting process.
The CEC member for health was most frequently
described as leading the priority-setting process for
health and playing a key role in negotiating between
decision-making actors when priorities differed. As a re-
sult, in a county where the CEC member for health has
an authoritarian leadership style, it is likely that the
priority-setting process will be less participatory, com-
pared with a leader who recognises the value of other
actors’ contributions. In our study, respondents from
three out of ten counties described a CEC member for
health (either present or recent past) who adopted an
authoritarian or dictatorial approach to decision-making,
with staff feeling disrespected and demotivated as a con-
sequence. In these counties other members of the
county health management team had limited knowledge
about what, how or why decisions were made. Within
counties with a leader who adopted an authoritarian
leadership style, even those involved with discussions at
times felt unable to question or challenge priorities with-
out fear of reprisal.
“I also think there is the power balance. There [are]
also some powerful positions …yet the decisions you
(the person in power) make are not good, and I am
below you and I know, we are supposed to do Y, yet
you are saying we should do X and because of that
power relations there is no way I am communicating
with you without the fear of losing my job, then we
make the wrong decisions.” County Health Respondent
IDI, Female69
Respondents from three counties did not describe particu-
larly strong examples of either authoritarian or participa-
tory leadership approaches. Meanwhile, respondents from
four counties described the use of participatory approaches
to priority-setting, opening up the priority-setting space to
include other stakeholders across the health system. In the
clearest example of this within a positive deviant county
which demonstrated strong participatory decision-making
approaches, a CEC member sought to ensure that other
actors within the county health management team, the
county assembly, health workers, administrators, commu-
nity health workers and community members were all
empowered with knowledge about health and health prior-
ities and were actively involved in identifying priorities, in-
formed by this knowledge.
“The process of making decisions is not a one man show.
I would like to say that first of all, even the strategies
that we have developed, there is what we call public
participation every year we ask the public what are
priorities they have? What do they need? … and we do
also have community representatives during the
budgeting process so that it is all inclusive so that
whatever we are doing is what the people want.” County
Health Respondent IDI, Male 50
Invited space: Citizens are invited to participate in
priority-setting by authorities, which in Kenya includes
the public participation forums (see [16] for more details
about the public participation forums, barriers to mean-
ingful engagement and examples of best practices).
These public meetings have been introduced since devo-
lution as a forum for accountability, with the objective
of ensuring community needs and priorities are reflected
in county government plans and budgets. Ideally, the
meetings should promote a ‘power with’ approach to
priority-setting, providing a range of actors with the
knowledge and opportunity to take part in actively
selecting priorities and monitoring progress towards
their attainment. However, failure to address under-
lying social norms and structures contribute to lim-
ited ‘power within’ by ‘ordinary’ citizens, including
those most marginalised (see Table 2). Community
members from formerly marginalised counties in
Northern Kenya are reluctant to participate in meet-
ings held by government actors to identify their needs
and priorities, due to their perception of unchanged
historic norms arising from colonisation which led to
decades of neglect within their region.
“…they (community) still have the perception that
this is the government that has neglected them for
all those years …actually a lot civic education
needs to be done if you want actually effective
participation.” County Health Respondent IDI,
Male48
As the quote indicates, for these populations and
other marginalised groups (such as women, youth,
street dwellers), historic, social, cultural norms and
discriminations continue to persist (despite legisla-
tion which provides scope for their participation). As
a consequence these norms impose limits to citizens’
sense of self-worth, self-knowledge and ‘power
within’, thereby limiting their agency to take up their
‘power to act’ now made available according to pol-
icy in the invited space of public participation for-
ums (see Table 2). In general, there have been
limited efforts made to educate community members
to understand their roles and responsibilities for par-
ticipating in decision-making, leading to continued
knowledge imbalance, and limiting the scope for
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genuine community empowerment and participation
within priority-setting processes. This is further ex-
plored through the ‘invisible’ forms of power operat-
ing, which influence an individual’s agency to move
into invited spaces (see Table 2).
In fact, not only are marginalised community mem-
bers reluctant to participate due to limited ‘power
within’, but there was suggestion by a minority of na-
tional level respondents that there may be reluctance
on the part of county leaders to share power with the
community in general, due to the perception that by
empowering the community they would themselves
lose power. As a consequence these invited spaces be-
came tokenistic, failing to promote the ‘power with’
approach to priority-setting between county level and
community actors as intended.
“A lot of other counties are actually hesitant to
implement public participation models because they
want to have all the power, not to give the
communities power.” National Respondent IDI,
Male10
Claimed spaces: These are spaces claimed by less power-
ful actors from existing power holders. These were infre-
quently described by respondents in our study. There was
little discussion about how health workers can engage and
re-claim power from politicians to ensure their involve-
ment and technical appropriateness of priorities set. Al-
though the recurring health worker strikes following
devolution may be considered to indicate their efforts to
re-claim power, as they pressed for re-centralisation of
health service delivery to national government [31]. A mi-
nority of respondents acknowledged a gap for citizens to
hold their service providers to account. In response to this
gap, there were some early examples of social media plat-
forms being established by citizens to raise awareness
about poor quality services.
“…currently sometimes even in the internet [like]
facebook, what you usually see [is] people writing things.
So you realize that sometimes, something that should
have been solved earlier, blows up into a political
matter…It should have been very simple, because if you
had gotten in touch with the person who was
complaining…But we don’t have a system even of
measuring the satisfaction of the people.” County Health
Respondent IDI, Male09
Other respondents, particularly county level technical
respondents, highlighted the need for citizens to hold
leaders to account for providing (or not) health services.
However, some citizens themselves highlighted their
confusion surrounding how this could be done.
3. Forms and visibility of power
‘Visible power’ - Within Kenya there is a clear general
process for how priorities should be set, which is out-
lined within the new Constitution, although it contains
limited specific guidance for how the process should be
implemented. In many instances respondents described
examples where visible power was used to tackle inequi-
ties, with county governments seeking to address in-
equitable availability and access to health services,
through investment in infrastructure and recruitment of
additional human resources for health. In general this
process was followed across the study counties. How-
ever, while the process was followed, some of the steps
were merely perfunctory in nature – fulfilling the re-
quirements but not striving towards attaining the objec-
tives specified in the Constitution.
“It [decision-making process] is just but it is not fair
(laughter) …It is just because the process is followed
and people are involved in the decision-making. But it
is not fair, because you go through that process and at
the end of the day, you don’t achieve anything.”
County Non-Health Respondent IDI, Female34
‘Hidden power’ –As a consequence of the rapid roll-out
of devolution, additional guidance surrounding priority-
setting processes and structures (including accountabil-
ity mechanisms), county laws and policies and recruit-
ment of needed staff had not yet been put in place when
the reforms started. This created a vacuum at county
level, which allowed ‘hidden power’ to have a dispropor-
tionate effect, with certain powerful actors able to control
the extent to which other actors are included (or not) in
identifying priorities, the content of the priority-setting
agenda and ultimately the priorities set. In our study many
community members and providers (including technical
health systems decision-makers from county, sub-county
and health facility level) highlighted that tribalism and pa-
tronage norms (which were common within the former
centralised government), have continued in some counties
under the devolved government.
Politicians, including the governor and members of
county assembly, were commonly perceived by county
technical decision-makers and national key informants
to be motivated to a large degree by their own political
aspirations, desire to secure votes during election or to
repay promises made as a result of patronage. This was
felt to have led to preference and over-investment in vis-
ible and popular priorities such as ambulances and infra-
structure over less visible public health interventions or
quality improvement, with more resources distributed
within areas of political support for a powerful leader,
rather than the area of greatest need.
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“So as a governor, if these are my voters in terms of my
investment I would rather focus on these pockets that
give me votes, rather than these ones who still need a
lot of support in health.” National respondent IDI,
Male05
‘Invisible power’ – In our study, community members
themselves did not generally consider priority-setting as
one of their health-related roles. Underlying norms and
discriminations such as tribalism, sexism, classism or
ableism have not been adequately addressed since devo-
lution, with inadequate actions to accommodate attend-
ance at community meetings by ‘marginalised’ groups.
This is despite measures having been introduced in pol-
icy including guidance specifying that no more than
two thirds of membership of county assembly are of
the same gender, 5 % of community representatives
appointed or elected to public bodies are persons with
disability, and that the state should put in place af-
firmative action programmes to ensure minorities and
marginalised groups participate and are represented in
governance [14]. According to the Constitution, those
identified as marginalised include women, persons with
disabilities, youth, ethnic and other minorities and mar-
ginalised communities (small/ traditional/ indigenous
community, pastoralists) [14]. Even more worrying is
the absence of any guidance within the Constitution for
other marginalised groups, including gay and lesbian
persons, street dwellers, drug and alcohol users or ex-
treme poor. All these groups were identified (to varying
degrees) as ‘vulnerable’ by study respondents, yet there
is no clear legislation to promote their participation in
decision-making. Unsurprisingly, power differentials
between marginalised groups, other community mem-
bers, politicians and actors facilitating meetings per-
sists. Our findings reveal that in patriarchal
communities many women may have too many respon-
sibilities at home to be able to attend public participa-
tion meetings or do not have the confidence to speak
out even if they do attend. Those who were illiterate,
poor, have a disability, live far from the meeting loca-
tion or don’t read English (the language meetings are
advertised in) experienced barriers to attending and/or
participating. For such reasons, power imbalances per-
mit the views of more powerful actors to dominate
leaving priority-setting open to manipulation by local
elites, which can lead to selection of inappropriate pri-
orities.
“…some of the challenges are political because you
realise politics plays in almost everything so if a
person wants something you just go to the community
and pressure them and these people the community
come up with a wrong decision on health because of
politics … based on someone else’s interest which is
not good.” County Non-Health Respondent IDI,
Male33
Discussion
We found Kenya’s transition towards devolution is trans-
forming the former centralised balance of power, leading to
greater ability for influence at the county level, with redu-
cing power at national and sub-county (district) levels and
limited change at community level. Within these changing
power structures, politicians are felt to play a greater role in
priority-setting for health. The interfaces and tensions be-
tween state politicians, technical health service providers
and the community has at times been felt to undermine
technical priorities. While power has changed drastically at
the higher levels, there has been varied and typically lim-
ited consistent change at community level. Underlying so-
cial structures and discriminations generally continue
unchanged, leading to the continued exclusion of those
most vulnerable from priority-setting processes. Through
application of Gaventa’s power cube framework and
Veneklasen’s expressions of power, we systematically iden-
tified the changing power distribution since Kenya de-
volved services in 2013 and the influence of social norms,
structures and discriminations on the distribution of
power, the space of power and the visibility of power.
Devolution in Kenya has reduced the power formerly
enjoyed by national authorities. Political actors at the
county level now have unprecedented ability to set prior-
ities and to control resources, leading to increased power
at this level. Politicians are often motivated to provide
electorally appealing services which will consolidate polit-
ical support and maximise their voter base in pursuit of
re-election [32]. The politicisation of priority-setting for
health can bring positive results towards improving access
to health services, with UHC having previously been
recognised as an ‘electoral asset’ [33]. However, there are
also threats that local patronage will influence the
provision of health services, contributing to an accumula-
tion of services within home areas for more powerful
decision-making actors [21]. In keeping with findings
from Philippines, Indonesia and Kenya [11, 18, 34], health
workers from sub-county and facility level in Kenya have
experienced a loss of power. In keeping with an earlier
study in Kenya, we found that these health workers de-
scribed exclusion from the county-level priority-setting
processes and a lack of clarity surrounding their new role
following introduction of devolution [18]. This has at
times led to the setting of priorities which do not always
meet urgent technical needs, contributing to demotivation
among health workers. An earlier study in Kenya found
that sub-county level managers had sought to ‘claim
power’ and support other health workers, within the space
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available to them [18]. At community level, mechanisms
to engage citizens within priority-setting have been estab-
lished, but as the Additional file 1 by McCollum et al.
(2018) highlights, these mechanisms face major con-
straints to facilitating the meaningful participation of ‘or-
dinary’ citizens [16]. These constraints largely reflect those
identified by Cleary et al.(2013) [35] and include limited
respect from certain actors, limited investment and alloca-
tion of resources to facilitate involvement of marginalised
groups and failure to address underlying values, beliefs
and cultures which act to exclude certain actors from the
decision-making table.
Objectives for devolution in Kenya (such as citizens’
empowerment, promotion of national unity and eradica-
tion of inequalities [14]) are in part an effort to alleviate
the effects of structural forces such as colonisation,
which had led to the ethnocentrism fuelled violence dur-
ing 2007 elections and long-standing inequities based on
geographic location or tribe [29]. Local, regional, na-
tional and international norms, forces and systems form
a complex web that combines to create and sustain so-
cial and health inequities [36]. In keeping with aspects of
two recent Kenyan studies [37, 38] our findings reveal
that patronage norms, including former politicians’ en-
couragement of citizens to evaluate their leader based
on his/her ability to fund projects for certain groups in
local communities [38] have not yet been eradicated. In-
stead, in a minority of counties these norms have found
ways to flourish within the devolved governance system,
leading to nepotism and service distribution which aligns
with patronage networks rather than need. This has con-
tributed to over-emphasis on visible curative services, to
the neglect of less tangible but often more equitable and
cost-effective public health services, such as community
health. This exploitation of the priority-setting process
to secure votes is in keeping with the ‘majority voting
model’ outlined by Goddard et al. (2006) [32] and previ-
ously observed in Tanzania [39]. Respondents from
formerly marginalised counties spoke about the reluc-
tance of citizens to engage with community governance
mechanisms, highlighting the need to first address the
political and historical legacies before citizens will par-
ticipate [40]. In general, community members do not
seem to have been adequately informed about their role
within priority-setting, the choice of interventions avail-
able to them or provided with the data which would
allow them to make informed decisions. This is similar
to other contexts where governments obstruct or resist
community participation, which raises concerns about
living conditions or proposes solutions [39, 40].
In Kenya, and other contexts undergoing health sys-
tems change there is need to strengthen meaningful
community empowerment, by addressing underlying
norms and structures which create a barrier to the
expression of ‘power within’ by disadvantaged commu-
nity members and which encourages ‘power with’ and
‘power to’ expressions of power [2]. This will need spe-
cific actions to ensure inclusion of ‘disadvantaged
groups’, standards placed on local governments and cre-
ation of conditions for deliberation within public partici-
pation forums [41]. Properly functioning accountability
mechanisms should support governance and ensure an-
swerability between actors [35] involved with setting pri-
orities, providing services and their recipients within
communities.
Limitations
The diversity between Kenya’s 47 counties may limit
generalizability of findings. The selection of ten study
counties tried to ensure diversity in demographic, geo-
graphic, social, cultural and economic differences. Inter-
views were conducted with county leaders across ten
counties, and with health workers in three and community
members in two counties due to time and resource con-
straints, and so findings are not necessarily generalisable
across the country. The restructuring and implications for
power within priority-setting and at community level will
adapt over time. As such, we can only ever present a snap-
shot of this in a particular time and place. However, we
have tried to consider how historical factors have changed
over time leading up to devolution and their impact for its
implications. Positionality of the main interviewer as a for-
eign researcher may have inhibited some respondents
from openly sharing their opinions. Conversely, some re-
spondents may have felt less threatened and discussed
more. Inclusion of experienced Kenyan co-authors in
study design and analysis sought to bring ‘insider’ perspec-
tives to the study.
Recommendations
Power analysis of priority-setting at county level, after de-
volution in Kenya highlights the need for stronger institu-
tional structures, processes and norms to reduce the
power imbalances between decision-making actors. Poten-
tial opportunities to address these imbalances include:
1. Promote transparency and accountability between
political and technical actors, by involving
politicians (e.g. representative for health for county
assembly) within routine quarterly planning
meetings, allowing opportunity for technical actors
to share routine monitoring, progress, challenges
faced and to respond to any questions or concerns
from politicians.
2. Build capacity of political actors to understand
health holistically, including preventive, promotive,
curative and rehabilitative services. Build capacity of
health providers to understand the needs of
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politicians so as to enable them to present
politicians with easy to interpret information about
cost-effectiveness, effectiveness and equity aspects
of various health interventions. Provide opportun-
ities for politicians to interact with and hear from
community health volunteers to understand more
about their work.
3. Build stronger platforms to engage health workers
at different levels (community and health facility
level) in priority-setting, in order to build ‘power
within’ and encourage their participation and shar-
ing of ‘power with’ other actors in priority-setting.
Along with promoting transparency between health
service providers and state actors.
4. Ensure governance and accountability measures, such
as public participation are meaningful, by reducing
the knowledge imbalance (between the community
and other technical and political actors) to develop
‘power within’ and encourage ‘power to’ participate in
priority-setting by different community members.
Provide community members with easily understood
information about the range of choices available to
them, the reasoning behind those choices and the
process for filtering choices. Create innovative ap-
proaches to ensure participation from those consid-
ered ‘marginalised’ in priority-setting, such as women
only meetings in certain contexts or use of social
media platforms with youth.
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